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Why	culture	is	more	important	than	skills:
understanding	British	public	opinion	on	immigration
Opposition	to	immigration	is	largely	cultural	and	psychological,	and	policy	will	have	to	address	this,
writes	Eric	Kaufmann.	He	provides	recent	survey	evidence	that	backs	his	argument,	and	explains
why	current	policy-making	seems	to	be	based	on	the	wrong	assumptions.
The	report	of	the	House	of	Commons	Home	Affairs	Committee	Immigration	Policy:	basis	for	building
consensus	was	released	in	January.	It	makes	many	helpful	suggestions,	including	the	idea	of	an
annual	migration	report,	streamlined	immigration	processing,	and	the	importance	of	balancing	competing	interests.
However,	it	draws	the	wrong	conclusions	about	public	opinion	and	policy	due	to	its	reliance	on	focus-groups,	which
suffer	from	social	desirability	bias.
As	a	result,	it	makes	two	assumptions.	First,	that	citizens	who	oppose	immigration	do	so	mainly	because	of	their
perceptions	of	its	effects	on	prosperity	or	public	services.	If	so,	immigration	is	an	issue	that	can	be	addressed	by
directing	financial	resources	to	areas	affected	by	migration,	holding	consultations,	and	communicating	the	economic
contribution	immigrants	make.	The	second	assumption	is	that	voters	are	primarily	concerned	about	control,	not
numbers.	If	they	are	reassured	that	things	are	under	control,	and	migration	is	being	calibrated	to	economic	needs,
they	will	be	content	with	higher	numbers.
The	report’s	principal	research	base	stems	from	polling	and	focus	group	work	by	British	Future	which	indicates	that
skills	are	the	most	important	consideration	for	people	when	they	think	of	a	desirable	immigrant.	This	gains	support
from	a	new	literature	which	uses	survey	experiments	asking	people	to	choose	between	two	stylised	immigrants	who
differ	in	either	economic	or	cultural	ways	from	each	other.	Across	a	wide	variety	of	different	pairwise	comparisons,
analysts	such	as	Jens	Hainmuller	and	Dan	Hopkins,	using	the	conjoint	technique,	are	able	to	assess	which	aspects
of	an	immigrant	render	them	more	or	less	desirable	–	whether	they	speak	the	language,	whether	they	are	European
or	non-European,	Muslim	or	not,	their	skill	level,	employment	and	so	forth.	This	work	shows	that	national	origin,
religion	and	race	matter,	but	most	respondents	in	most	countries	prioritise	immigrants’	skill	levels	over	ethno-cultural
considerations.	This	seems	to	indicate	that	people	are	most	interested	in	the	economic	contributions	migrants	can
bring.
Yet,	as	behavioural	economists	repeatedly	caution,	‘people	aren’t	rational,	they	rationalise.’	So	too	with	immigration
attitudes.	The	reasons	people	say	they	oppose	immigration	are	those	they	are	aware	of,	or	feel	to	be	socially
acceptable.	This	is	especially	the	case	in	focus	groups,	where	peer	pressure	is	strong.	Consider	the	Brexit	vote.
Leave	voters	told	exit	pollsters	it	was	about	sovereignty	and	feeling	‘left	behind’	by	prosperous	London.	But	as
Harold	Clarke,	Matthew	Goodwin	and	Paul	Whiteley	show,	survey	data	clearly	reveal	that	the	vote	was	linked	to
opposition	to	immigration.	Indeed	views	on	capital	punishment	count	far	more	in	predicting	whether	someone	is	a
Brexiteer	than	their	class,	income	or	beliefs	about	whether	‘the	people’	should	make	decisions	rather	than	politicians.
The	consensus	in	the	quantitative	academic	literature	is	that	personal	economic	circumstances	matter	much	less
than	cultural/psychological	orientations	in	predicting	immigration	attitudes.
So	we	have	a	disconnect:	the	multivariate	survey	research	finds	that	cultural	attitudes	correlate	most	strongly	with
views	on	immigration	levels,	with	economics	counting	less.	Yet	the	experimental	research	seems	to	indicate	that
people	value	skills	more	than	ethnicity	in	an	immigrant.	How	can	this	be?
The	mystery	drops	away	when	we	consider	that	the	experimental	surveys	ask	about	the	properties	of	desirable
immigrants,	not	those	of	immigration.	When	people	think	of	immigrants,	they	think	of	an	individual,	and	assess	them
accordingly.	When	they	think	of	immigration,	they	consider	aggregate	effects,	which	their	minds	treat	as	a	separate
question.	As	I’ll	show,	people	are	sensitive	to	the	skill	level	of	the	immigrant	intake,	but	this	is	trumped	by	their
concern	for	the	cultural	impact	of	a	larger	inflow.
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To	illustrate,	I	draw	on	data	from	a	new	Yougov-Birkbeck-Policy	Exchange	survey	of	1643	individuals	from	5-6
November	2017,	of	which	1450	are	of	White	British	ethnicity.	The	question	asked:	‘The	government	is	considering	its
options	for	Britain’s	immigration	policy	after	Brexit.	Currently	Britain	has	net	migration	of	275,000	per	year	of	which
about	half	is	European.	After	Brexit,	European	migration	is	expected	to	decline.	Two	options	are	on	the	table,	which
do	you	prefer?’
The	sample	was	divided	into	nine	equal	groups	for	analysis.	The	first	of	nine	groups	saw	the	following	set	of	options:
(a)	Increase	skilled	immigration	from	outside	Europe,	keeping	net	migration	at	275,000,	raising	the	skilled	share	from
40%	to	50%.
(b)	Decrease	skilled	immigration	from	outside	Europe,	decreasing	net	migration	from	275,000	to	125,000,	lowering
the	skilled	share	from	40%	to	20%.
(c)	Don’t	know.
People	are	being	asked	to	trade	off	between	a	high-skill/high	intake	and	low-skill/low-number	intake	option.	34%
opted	for	option	high	skill/high	intake,	30%	for	low	skill/low	intake,	with	36%	saying	‘don’t	know’.	This	even	holds
when	we	ask	about	raising	numbers,	as	with:
(a)	Increase	skilled	immigration	from	outside	Europe,	increasing	net	migration	from	275,000	to	375,000,	raising	the
skilled	share	from	40%	to	60%.
(b)	Decrease	skilled	immigration	from	outside	Europe,	decreasing	net	migration	from	275,000	to	125,000,	lowering
the	skilled	share	from	40%	to	20%.
Result	among	those	who	answered	are	31%	for	increase,	29%	for	decrease.	In	other	words,	52%	of	those	who
answered	the	question	backed	the	high	skill,	high	immigration	option.	So	far	so	good:	a	modest	endorsement	of	the
experimental	literature,	and	of	British	Future’s	work,	which	shows	that	when	the	skill	set	is	right,	a	(bare)	majority	of
people	will	endorse	current	levels.
But	now	consider	the	next	group’s	set	of	choices.	The	only	change	in	wording	here	is	that	I	have	replaced	‘outside
Europe’	with	‘Africa	and	Asia’:
(a)	Increase	skilled	immigration	from	Africa	and	Asia,	keeping	net	migration	at	275,000,	raising	the	skilled	share	from
40%	to	50%.
(b)	Decrease	skilled	immigration	from	Africa	and	Asia,	decreasing	net	migration	from	275,000	to	125,000,	lowering
the	skilled	share	from	40%	to	20%.
(c)	Don’t	know.
Now	just	18%	are	content	with	a	high-skill/current	migration	level	mix,	40%	want	a	decrease	with	a	lower	skill	mix,
and	43%	don’t	know.	That’s	69%	in	favour	of	a	decrease	in	numbers	and	skills	versus	31%	for	current	levels	with
higher	skills.	Culture	clearly	matters.	Yet	it	turns	out	this	is	not	the	strongest	cultural	effect	we	find.
Consider	the	next	set	of	options,	based	on	ethnic	population	projections:
(a)	Increase	immigration	from	outside	Europe,	keeping	net	migration	at	275,000,	raising	the	skilled	share	from	40%
to	50%.	As	a	result,	the	White	British	share	of	the	UK’s	population	will	decline	from	80%	today	to	58%	in	2060.
(b)	Decrease	immigration	from	outside	Europe,	decreasing	net	migration	from	275,000	to	125,000,	lowering	the
skilled	share	from	40%	to	20%.	As	a	result,	the	White	British	share	of	the	UK’s	population	will	decline	from	80%
today	to	65%	in	2060.
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This	time,	the	wording	remains	unchanged	from	that	of	the	first	group,	but	we	draw	attention	to	the	impact	higher
numbers	will	have	on	long-term	ethnic	change.	Rather	than	a	–	still	substantial	–	shift	from	80%	to	65%	White	British
by	2060	under	the	low	immigration	option,	we	note	that	current	immigration	levels	will	mean	a	change	from	80%	to
58%	White	British	by	2060,	broadly	in	line	with	projections.	With	this	choice	in	front	of	them,	only	27%	favour	current
levels	with	higher	skills	compared	to	73%	who	prefer	a	decrease	even	though	this	means	a	lower	skill	mix.
Across	all	nine	variations,	focusing	on	the	1450	White	British	respondents,	we	get	the	results	in	figure	1.
Figure	1.
This	shows	that	a	majority	of	White	British	respondents	want	reduced	immigration	even	if	skill	levels	fall.	But	when
the	question	is	worded,	as	in	example	1,	as	new	skilled	immigrants	coming	from	‘outside	Europe’	and	when	the
decline	in	White	British	share	is	not	mentioned,	it’s	possible	to	get	almost	45%	of	White	Britons	to	back	the	high	skill
mix-with-high	levels	of	immigration	option.	Mention	‘Asia	and	Africa’	as	the	source	for	new	skilled	immigrants	and
support	slips	ten	points	to	35%.	More	importantly,	mentioning	the	ethno-cultural	impact	of	higher	numbers	on	the
long-term	share	of	White	Britons	in	the	population	drops	support	for	current	immigration	levels	by	17-22	points	to	just
18-25%.
We	shouldn’t	kid	ourselves.	The	trends	in	figure	2,	showing	a	link	between	net	migration,	news	coverage,	and	the
salience	of	immigration,	is	likely	to	continue	in	Britain.	It’s	a	trend	James	Dennison	and	his	colleagues	have	noticed
in	most	West	European	countries.	This	is	largely	because	of	its	cultural	and	psychological	impact,	which	immigration
opponents	are	compelled	by	social	norms	to	rationalise	in	economic	terms.	Focus	groups	are	especially	susceptible
to	this.	The	Committee	seem	to	have	taken	these	rationales	at	face	value,	drawing	distorted	policy	conclusions.
Figure	2.
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Source:	Ipsos-Mori	‘Shifting	Ground,’	2015,	p.	5.
Moving	to	a	Canadian-style	system	of	three-year	immigration	plans,	as	the	report	recommends,	may	be	problematic
for	Britain.	Canada’s	latest	three-year	migration	plan	for	2018-20	will	welcome	330,000	immigrants	per	year,
equivalent	in	UK	terms	to	net	migration	of	around	600,000	per	annum,	twice	the	current	UK	level.	This	has	occurred
because	norms	of	political	discourse	in	English-speaking	Canada	are	similar	to	those	which	obtained	in	Germany
and	Sweden	prior	to	2015	–	in	which	it	is	deemed	improper	for	politicians	or	editorial	pages	to	advocate	reducing
immigration.	Part	of	this,	note	Emma	Ambrose	and	Cas	Mudde,	stems	from	broadly-defined	hate	speech	laws
grounded	in	the	1971	Multiculturalism	Act,	which	arguably	encompass	voicing	opposition	to	immigration.	This	is
clearly	not	the	case	in	Britain,	thus	an	attempt	to	transplant	the	Canadian	approach	is	likely	to	encounter
considerable	resistance.
Opposition	to	immigration	is	largely	cultural	and	psychological.	Policy	options	will	therefore	have	to	address	this.
Bracketing	the	question	of	numbers,	I’ve	argued	here	and	here	that	one	approach	is	to	alter	our	current	form	of
political	communication	to	frame	immigration	to	conservative	voters	as	something	which	their	ethnic	group	will
ultimately	absorb	through	intermarriage	and	assimilation	leaving	the	country	little	changed.	Only	by	engaging	with
voters’	actual	cultural-psychological	concerns	can	we	begin	to	approach	the	common	ground	the	report’s	authors
seek.	By	contrast,	the	economic	measures	and	procedures	the	Committee	recommends	are	unlikely	to	affect	public
opinion.
________
Note:	a	version	of	this	article	was	originally	published	on	Policy	Exchange.
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